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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether defense counsel was properly prohibited 
from impeaching a prosecution witness through the admission of 
acts of prior misconduct which did not result in a conviction. 
2. Whether the trial judge properly instructed the 
jury with respect to the habitual criminal charge. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
PATRICK J . HACKFORD, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 20604 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant, Patrick J. Hackford, was charged with two 
counts of burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended, two counts of theft, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1953), as amended, and Being An Habitual Criminal, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1953), 
as amended. 
Defendant was convicted of both counts of theft and of 
being an habitual criminal, in a jury trial held March 20, 1985, 
in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Duchesne 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard C. Davidson, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Davidson to one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for each count of theft, 
the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant was further 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for five years to life for 
being an habitual criminal, to run consecutively to the above 
sentences. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 27 and 29, 1984, defendant and Joe 
Lane drove up near the Gulf Oil yard in the early morning hours 
(T. 58-9) • Defendant to ld Mr. Lane to drive the truck up the 
road and wait about 30 minutes and then come back and pick him up 
(T. 59) . Mr. Lane saw defendant jump the fence and when he came 
back, defendant had thrown seven d r i l l b i t s f two b a t t e r i e s , and 
e i g h t to ten new t i r e s over the fence (T. 59) . They loaded the 
s t o l e n items in the truck (T. 6 0 ) . A day or two l a t e r they 
returned t o Gulf Oil and s t o l e the remainder of the t i r e s stored 
in the shed using the same method (T. 61) . 
Shortly therea f t er , both defendant and Mr. Lane sold 
the s t o l e n t i r e s t o various ind iv idua l s and sold the d r i l l b i t s 
to a d r i l l b i t repair shop in Carson Ci ty , Nevada for $4,800 
using f a l s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (T. 62-66, 107, 1 1 0 ) . 
Joe Lane pled g u i l t y to a charge of the f t in return for 
four other charges ar i s ing out of the inc idents at Gulf Oil being 
dropped (T. 69 -70 , 7 6 ) . He was l a t e r ca l l ed as a prosecution 
witness at Mr. Hackford's t r i a l . He repeatedly t e s t i f i e d there 
had been no agreement entered i n t o with the S ta te in return for 
h i s testimony (T. 69, 72 , 75 ) . On cross examination, defense 
counsel inquired i n t o the plea bargain involv ing the Gulf Oil 
inc ident , and then, without lay ing any foundation, defense 
counsel inquired, "What happened on a l l the bad check charges you 
had prior to that?" This attempt to impeach Mr. Lane fs testimony 
by inquiring about charges e n t i r e l y unrelated t o the present case 
was objected to by the S t a t e , and a hearing was held out of the 
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presence of the jury (T. 76-80)* The trial judge ruled that 
defense counsel could only ask whether the witness had been 
convicted of a felony and could inquire as to the disposition of 
any charges related to the Gulf Oil theft, but defense counsel 
was precluded from inquiring about unrelated charges (T. 78-80). 
During the course of the hearing, the prosecution noted that any 
inquiry as to whether there had been any kind of an agreement 
made could, of course, be approached without asking this witness 
about any earlier arrests (T. 81). 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft. The 
trial court instructed the jury on the habitual criminal charge 
(T. 184-85). The State introduced two minute entries (£££ 
Addendum) which contained two prior sentences and commitments 
dated September 14, 1977 and October 27, 1980 providing the basis 
for the habitual criminal charge (T. 186-87) . Defendant was then 
convicted of being an habitual criminal (T. 194) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial judge properly prohibited defense counsel 
from impeaching a prosecution witness by asking questions about 
acts of prior misconduct. Furthermore, the trial court properly 
instructed the jury regarding the charge of being an habitual 
criminal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PROHIBITED 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM IMPEACHING A 
PROSECUTION WITNESS BY ASKING 
QUESTIONS REGARDING PRIOR ACTS OF 
MISCONDUCT NOT RESULTING IN A , 
CONVICTION. 
Defendant claims t ha t the t r i a l court committed 
reve r s ib le error by disallowing cross-examination of Joe Lane 
regarding pr ior unrelated charges of wri t ing bad checks. He 
contends tha t the prior charges were re levant in tha t they would 
purportedly show tha t Mr. Lane had entered in to a deal with the 
p rosecu to r ' s off ice in exchange for his testimony in the present 
case. He never substant ia ted t h i s supposit ion through other 
evidence a t t r i a l . 
Although i t i s recognized t ha t exposure of a witness1 
motivation in t e s t i fy ing i s a proper function of c ross -
examination, defendant i s not e n t i t l e d t o embark on f ishing 
- p e d i t i o n s . S ta te v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983). 
layton, t h i s Court held t h a t the defendant was properly 
precluded from asking quest ions about possible grants of immunity 
in the absence of foundation for such ques t ions . In the ins tan t 
cases , defendant was allowed to ask Mr. Lane several times 
whether he had entered in to an agreement with the prosecutor in 
re turn for his testimony (T. 75, 83-4, 85, 87). Without further 
admissible evidence of such an agreement between Mr. Lane and the 
prosecutor , defendant must accept the witness1 answer. 
The Supreme Court of the United S ta tes has s ta ted tha t 
although a character witness may be cross-examined as to the 
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a r r e s t of the defendant, t h i s should not be confused with the 
rule that prohib i t s cross-examination as to c r e d i b i l i t y by asking 
the witness whether he himself has been a r re s t ed . Michelson v. 
United S t a t e s , 335 U.S. 469, 582 (1948). The Court explained the 
d i s t i nc t i on by s t a t i n g , "Arrest without more does not, in law any 
more than in reason, impeach the i n t e g r i t y or impair the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of a wi tness . I t happens to the innocent as well as 
the gu i l t y . Only a conviction, therefore , may be inquired about 
to undermine the t rustworthiness of a wi tness . " Xd. 
Defendant c i t e s Rules 405 and 608, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (Supp. 1983) as supporting h is pos i t ion tha t prior 
misconduct i s admissible during cross-examination to impeach a 
wi tness . Rule 40 5 is wholly i r re levant to the i s sue . However, 
Rule 608(b) spec i f i ca l ly governs the issue and provides in 
per t inen t p a r t : 
Specif ic instances of the conduct of a 
witness , for the purpose of a t tacking 
or supporting h i s c r e d i b i l i t y , other than 
conviction of crime as provided in Rule 
609, may not be proved by e x t r i n s i c 
evidence. They may, however, in the 
d i sc re t ion of the court , if probative 
of t ru thfulness or untruthfulness , be 
inquired in to on cross-examination of 
the witness (1) concerning his character 
for t ruthfulness or untruthfulness . 
Therefore, the general rule disallows admission of 
spec i f i c instances of prior conduct of a witness for impeachment 
purposes. Any exception to the general ru le i s l e f t to the 
d i sc re t ion of the t r i a l court in instances concerning the 
wi tness ' character for t ru thfulness or untruthfulness . In the 
present case, the t r i a l judge ruled tha t Mr. Lane's a r r e s t for 
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bad checks was i rre l evant t o the i s sue of h i s c r e d i b i l i t y . The 
t r i a l judge allowed quest ions as to whether Mr. Lane had been 
convicted of a felony and quest ions regarding h i s involvement in 
the ins tant ca se . Moreover the defense never e s tab l i shed through 
other evidence or by way of proffer that the bad check charges 
were somehow l inked t o any agreement to provide testimony at t h i s 
t r i a l . 
In determining the extent of cross-examination, t h i s 
Court w i l l only dis turb the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l court upon a 
c l ear showing of a pre judic ia l abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Michelson v . 
United StateSr 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948); S ta te v. S tarks . 581 
P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1978) . 
In Starks . applying former Rules 22 and 47, Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1971) which are comparable to Rule 608, t h i s Court 
held that defense counsel was precluded from introducing evidence 
of prior misconduct to attack a wi tness 1 c r e d i b i l i t y . 581 P.2d 
1015 (Utah 1978) . 
Res tr i c t ing cross-examination of prior misconduct of a 
wi tness for impeachment purposes i s the bet ter rule because i t 
precludes attack of the c r e d i b i l i t y of a wi tness where s p e c i f i c 
a c t s have not resu l ted in a conv ic t ion . See Michelson, smma. 
I t a l so avoids compelling the witness to defend against unproved 
charges and prevents the jury from being d i s trac ted by c o l l a t e r a l 
i s s u e s that could be highly inflammatory. S£& Boyce, Impeachment 
of Witnesses for Prior Criminal A c t i v i t y . Utah Bar J . 13 , 24 
(Sum.-Spr. 1975) . Therefore, the t r i a l judge properly ruled that 
evidence of an unrelated arres t without convict ion i s not 
admissible to impeach a w i t n e s s . 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY WITH REGARD TO THE CHARGE OF 
BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
Defendant contends that the trial judge improperly 
instructed the jury on the offense of being an habitual criminal 
by failing to inform them that the charge (presumably the 
habitual criminal charge) was a first degree felony and carried a 
five year to life sentence. This claim is unsupported and 
completely without merit. 
The possible sentence one can receive for being an 
habitual criminal is not an appropriate issue for the trier-of-
fact. The possible sentence is a question of law to be 
determined by the judge pursuant to legislative guidelines. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 and 76-3-203 (1973). 
Defendant also alleges that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that a prior suspended sentence which was 
executed at a later time for a probation violation could 
constitute a prior commitment for purposes of the habitual 
criminal statute. Instruction No. 2 reads: 
You are instructed that the word "Commited" 
[sic] means the order by which a person is 
sent to prison. You are further instructed 
that each time a person is ordered sent to 
prison in carrying out a sentence/ that 
person is being commited [sic]. It is 
irrelevant whether multiple commitments 
are to be served concurrentlyf that is 
at the same timer or consecutively/ that 
is separatly [sic]. 
(R. 176). The Utah habitual criminal statute provides: 
Any person who has been twice convicted/ 
sentenced/ and committed for felony 
offenses at least one of which offenses 
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having been at least a felony of the 
second degree or a crime which, if 
committed within this state would have 
been a capital felony, felony of the 
first degree or felony of the second 
degree, and was committed to any prison 
mayr upon conviction of at least a 
felony of the second degree committed 
in this stater other than murder in the 
first or second degree, be determined 
as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned 
in the state prison for from five years 
to life. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1975). 
To determine whether defendant was committed twice for 
purposes of the habitual criminal statute, it is necessary to 
define "committed." Absent a statutory or judicial definition, 
the trial court relied on Black's Law Dictionary which defines 
commitment as the order sending a person to prison. Therefore, 
because defendant was previously committed for two separate 
offenses, he is subject to the enhanced penalty of the habitual 
criminal statute. 
Defendant contends that because execution of his 
initial sentence was suspended and later imposed concurrently 
with his second sentence, the two sentences "merged" into one. 
This assertion is unsupported and without merit. 
Defendant was sentenced on September 14, 1977 in Case 
No. 817 to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. (£££ Addendum). 
Execution of the sentence was suspended and defendant was placed 
on probation for 3 years on conditions which included serving six 
months in the Duchesne County Jail and that he violate no laws 
while on probation. On October 27, 1980, defendant was again 
sentenced for an unrelated charge to 1-15 years in the Utah State 
-8-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pr i son and t h e p r io r sentence of September 14 , 1977 was ordered 
execu ted , the two sen tences t o run c o n c u r r e n t l y . (fL££ Addendum) . 
To determine i f t he two sen tences were two s e p a r a t e 
commitments, i t i s necessa ry t o cons ider the L e g i s l a t u r e ' s 
i n t e n t * If t he s t a t u t e was enac ted as a reformatory t o o l or i f 
t he l e g i s l a t u r e in tended a p a r t i c u l a r sequence for p r io r c r imes , 
d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n may have m e r i t . However, t h i s Court held 
t h a t the s t a t u t e was enac ted s o l e l y t o make p e r s i s t e n t of fenders 
sub jec t t o g r e a t e r s a n c t i o n s . S t a t e v . Montague. 671 P.2d 187, 
190 (Utah 1983) . Therefore , because defendant was conv ic t ed , 
sen tenced , and committed on two s e p a r a t e p r io r o f f enses , he i s 
s u b j e c t t o the enhanced pena l ty in tended by the enactment of the 
h a b i t u a l c r imina l s t a t u t e . 
CONCLUSION 
The t r i a l cour t p rope r ly denied defense counsel the 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o impeach a p rosecu t ion w i t n e s s through the 
admission of p r i o r a c t s of misconduct . Moreover, the t r i a l judge 
p roper ly i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y with respec t t o t h e h a b i t u a l 
c r imina l cha rge . Therefore , d e f e n d a n t ' s conv ic t i ons should be 
a f f i rmed. _ , 
DATED t h i s ^ day of December, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
At tornev General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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•tfp^" 
IN THE FOUHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
Stf io^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
PATRICK HACKFORD 
Plaintiff 
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. fll7 
DATE: September lii, 1977 
JUDGE: PAV1D SAM 
COURT REPORTER: RICHARD TATTON 
Defendant 
This matter was before the court for pronouncement of judgment with Dennis L. 
Draney, Duchesne County Attorney, appearing for the State. The defendant was pre-
sent and represented by James R. Hall. Counsel for defendant addressed the court 
in the defendant's behalf. Defendant addressed the court in his own behalf. 
The matter was convened to Chambers for conference with counsel and interested 
parties. 
The matter was again before the court for pronouncement of judgment. There being 
no legal reason why judgment should not be pronounced at this time it is the 
judgment of the court that defendant be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 
an indeterminate period of time not to exceed five (5) years. Execution of sen-
tence is suspended and defendant placed on probation for a period of three (3) years 
on the following terms and conditions: 
1. That he serve six months in the Duchesne County Jail. 
2. That he enter into an agreement with the Adult probation and 
Parole Department and that he abide by the terms thereof. 
3. That he be available to the department and the court whenever 
requested. 
k. That he violate no laws of the United States, State of Utah or 
any municipality wherein he may reside. 
5. The court retains jurisdiction to make further orders as they 
become necessary. 
Copy to: 
Dennis L. Draney 
Attorney at Law 
Box 1886 
Roosevelt, Utah 81*066 
James R. Hall 
Attorney at Lav 
Box 395 
Roosevelt, Utah 8^066 
Adult Probation and Parole Department 
6*4 East Main 
Vernal, Utah 8^078 
r>sw 
. FILED 
• &o Dfjfricl Court Ducfwyij 
$t?2 c 1377 
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F / L E D ' IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURR~ ' ' u C 
m
 ™ District Court 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
"\N0V i 0 1980 
^nty : « ^ S T ° 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
iSsesi0* 
y
 • •
< c
^
r t
^ e p u t y 
STATE OF UTAH 
P l a i n t i f f 
PATRICK HACKFQRD 
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 817 and 944 
DATE: October 27, 1980 
JUDGE: J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
COURT REPORTER: EDWARD V. QUIST 
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT 
These matters were before the court for termination of probation 
in case No. 817 and pronouncement of judgment in case No. 944. The 
State was represented by Dennis L. Draney. The defendant was present 
and represented by Ronald Yengitch. Counsel for defendant represents 
to the court that defendant admits the allegations in case #817 and in 
case #944 waives the pre-sentence report and requests sentencing at 
this time. 
There being no reason why judgment should not be pronounced at 
this time it is the order of the court that in case NO. 944 defendant 
be confined in the Utah State Prison for a term not less than one nor 
more than fifteen (15) years. In case No. 817 the sentence imposed by 
Judge Sorensen on 9-14-77, confinement in the Utah State Prison for a 
term not to exceed five (5) years, be executed. The two sentences will 
run concurrently. 
Defendant is remanded to t\iB custody of the Sheriff of Duchesne 
County for delivery to the Warden of the Utah State Prison for execution 
of sentence. 
Counsel for defendant is to make formal appeal to the court if he 
desires credit to be given for time already served in the Duchesne County 
Jail. 
Copy to: Dennis L. Draney Ronald Yengitch Adult Probation & Parole 
Duchesne County Atty. Attorney at Law 1052 West Market. Dr. 
P.O. Box 1886 44 Exchange Place Vernal, Utah 84078 
Roosevelt. Utah 84066 Salt Lake Citv. Attention: Ron Swenson 
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( 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County Of Ducheane ) 
I, Pog*r K f ^ r -n , C!?r'- r* Hc-^oenc County, Utah 
an:.? ox-o!..-*.. : -.' . .* r>? fto CJswict Court, do hereby 
c*rf / ;»^ v n.j '.'"Zv-2 f^.u '^"cclnn h o full. tru« 
enz? f^.T^-ji c.,.: of :»».• 01 li '•-ui GwCjrnant which fs on 
t'.'.'s »n rr^ o-iwj. 
In vl\r:cb' v,hr?r?cf I;. '-. i i r ' r :ot my hand and era' 
of tJi^ sjki'c? Ccuri c.i>ovo wvu/iU^edjcnjg flTff* day 
r fe' *> tn>u-qf: 
By —H/ f f . | i , , ' r fJLLus^L —Clerk . Dep*j;y 
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